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A B S T R A C T
An important role carried out by cyber-security experts is the assessment of proposed com-
puter systems, during their design stage.This task is fraught with difficulties and uncertainty,
making the knowledge provided by human experts essential for successful assessment.Today,
the increasing number of progressively complex systems has led to an urgent need to produce
tools that support the expert-led process of system-security assessment. In this research,
we use weighted averages (WAs) and ordered weighted averages (OWAs) with evolutionary
algorithms (EAs) to create aggregation operators that model parts of the assessment process.
We show how individual overall ratings for security components can be produced from ratings
of their characteristics, and how these individual overall ratings can be aggregated to produce
overall rankings of potential attacks on a system.As well as the identification of salient attacks
and weak points in a prospective system, the proposed method also highlights which factors
and security components contribute most to a component’s difficulty and attack ranking
respectively. A real world scenario is used in which experts were asked to rank a set of tech-
nical attacks, and to answer a series of questions about the security components that are
the subject of the attacks. The work shows how finding good aggregation operators, and
identifying important components and factors of a cyber-security problem can be auto-
mated.The resulting operators have the potential for use as decision aids for systems designers
and cyber-security experts, increasing the amount of assessment that can be achieved with
the limited resources available.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
As Internet use becomes ever more pervasive in day-to-day life
for tasks including Internet banking, e-commerce and
e-government, the risk of cyber-crime is a growing concern (see
Detica and Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance,
2011, Anderson et al., 2013 and Cruz et al., 2014). Assessing se-
curity risks associated with proposed systems in their design
phase is a non-trivial task that involves managing multiple
sources of uncertain information. For example, it is very dif-
ficult to estimate the costs of a successful attack, the likelihood
of a rare attack, as the tools and technologies available to
attackers/defenders are constantly changing (Tregear, 2001).
Because of these difficulties, a great deal of expertise is re-
quired to carry out such assessments.Typically, cyber-security
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experts are employed as they can provide comprehensive as-
sessments based on considerable expertise and insight while
also being able to assess the viability of existing cyber-
security tools and processes (e.g., anti-malware software). From
a computational point of view, their work can be likened to that
of a highly complex aggregation function, considering a large
number of uncertain data sources (e.g., other experts, users,
systems designers and security software/hardware) and fusing
these sources to build overall security assessments. However,
there is often a shortage of the level of cyber-security exper-
tise required to carry out detailed assessments, leading to an
urgent requirement for techniques and tools that can be used
to support experts, reducing their workload, and systems de-
signers, using models of expert knowledge to obtain estimates
of security for system designs.
As stated previously, the job of performing security assess-
ments is comparable to a complex aggregation function, fusing
multiple sources of disparate data to form an overall assess-
ment. In order to replicate this process in a computational
model, aggregation operators such as the arithmetic mean,
weighted average (WA), and ordered weighted average (OWA)
could be considered. As will be shown later, WAs and OWAs
allow the application of weightings to specific objects and spe-
cific positions in an ordering, respectively.We will employ both
of these methods in this research, exploiting their character-
istics to produce fused assessments.WAs are used to compute
assessments of security components using sub-assessments
of their characteristics, and OWA operators are used to compute
salience/difficulty rankings of specific technical attacks using
security component assessments. A difficulty when usingWAs
and OWAs is finding suitable weightings for a particular task,
as there are an near-infinite number of possibilities. Evolu-
tionary algorithms (EAs) (Holland, 1975 and Goldberg, 1989) have
been shown to be useful in tasks involving a large search area,
including searching for OWAweights (Nettleton and Torra, 2001).
In the research presented in this paper, we will employ EAs
to search for appropriate weights for WAs and OWAs for use
in a security assessment problem.
The data set used is from a decision making exercise that
was conducted at GCHQ, Cheltenham, UK, the UK govern-
ment’s signals intelligence and information assurance agency.
Thirty nine GCHQ selected cyber-security experts including
system and software architects, security consultants, penetra-
tion testers, vulnerability researchers and specialist systems
evaluators, took part in two survey exercises. In the first, they
were asked to rank a set of ten technical attacks in order of
how difficult they would be to complete without being noticed.
The set included attacks via a voice over IP (VOIP) client, a mal-
formed document via email and a malicious website. In the
second exercise, experts were asked to rate the difficulty of
compromising/bypassing the twenty six security compo-
nents that make up the ten attacks from the previous exercise.
Security components included anti-virus software, crypto-
graphic devices and firewalls. They were also asked to rate
specific characteristics of each component, for example, the
complexity of a component or the public availability of tools that
could be used by a potential attacker to compromise/bypass
the component. Undertaking this type of survey can identify
particularly weak points in a system, and thus potential “breach-
points” in the system. As such, this activity is an important
part of the security assessment process. The result is a data
set containing three levels of assessment:
1. Rankings of technical attacks on a proposed system.
2. Ratings of the level of security offered by security compo-
nents in the proposed system.
3. Ratings of specific characteristics of security components
in the proposed system.
Fig. B.1 shows the structure of the data set.With this data
set we will show how, usingWAs and OWAs with EAs, the fol-
lowing can be achieved:
1. Ratings of the difficulty of attacking and evading security
components using ratings of specific characteristics.
2. Indication of the relative contribution each characteristic
makes to theoverall difficulty rating for a security component.
3. Rankings of specific technical attacks using ratings of se-
curity components.
4. Indication of the relative contribution components make
to the attack ranking based on their difficulty rating.
5. A combination of the previous aggregations, in which
rankings of specific technical attacks are computed using
security component ratings that have been created using
ratings of specific characteristics.
As we have data at all three levels, we are able to compare
the derived security component ratings and attack rankings
with experts’ actual ratings/rankings to validate them. Poten-
tially, this method could be used with a database of existing
ratings for components/characteristics to aid in security as-
sessments on proposed systems, reducing load on the cyber-
security experts who currently carry out such assessments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the problem of performing security assessments
on information systems, a review of machine learning ap-
proaches to this problem,WA/OWA operators and EAs. Section
3 describes the decisionmaking exercise conductedwith cyber-
security experts at GCHQ,while Section 4 details howEAs,OWAs
andWAs have been implemented for this study. In Section 5,
overall difficulty ratings for security components are pro-
ducedusing ratingsof specific characteristics of eachcomponent.
Moreover, we also produce weightings that signify the contri-
bution each characteristicmakes to the overall difficulty rating.
Fig. B.1 – Structure of assessment data.
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Then, in Section 6 rankings for specific technical attacks are
produced using difficulty ratings of their constituent compo-
nents, along with weightings that give an indication of which
components contribute most to the rankings. Section 7 com-
bines the processes of the previous two sections to derive ratings
and rankings for specific technical attacks from ratings of spe-
cific characteristics of their constituent components. Finally,
the outcomes of thework are discussed in Section 8, and Section
9 summarises the contributions of the research and considers
future directions of research.
2. Background
2.1. Cyber-security assessment
In current times, the use of the Internet and cellular net-
works has become the norm for a variety of every-day tasks
including banking, e-mail, e-government, e-commerce, VOIP,
social networking and mobile telecommunications. An ever-
increasing number of sensitive interactions are taking place
online, making them susceptible to attack by cyber-criminals
who may read, modify or delete sensitive data. Concurrently,
the volume and availability of tools to aid would-be attackers
in their acts are also increasing. These tools lower the barrier
to entry for attackers, as far less technical expertise is re-
quired to operate them than to launch an attack from scratch.
Exacerbating the situation further is the fact that it is often
unclear exactly how defensive security products achieve their
claims, and indeed, whether they are effective at all.
With the increasing threat of cyber-crime the practice of car-
rying out security assessments onproposed systemshas become
a critical part of the systems design process. Understanding
the threats that attackers pose to a proposed system, their con-
sequences, how those threats can be addressed and what
represents an appropriate level of security is a complex problem
involving many factors. These factors include (Tregear, 2001):
1. Data are limited on certain threats, such as the likelihood
of a sophisticated hacker attack and the costs of damage,
loss, or disruption caused by events that exploit security
weaknesses.
2. Some costs, such as loss of customer confidence or disclo-
sure of sensitive information, are inherently difficult to
quantify.
3. Although the cost of the hardware and software needed to
strengthen controls may be known, it is often not possible
to precisely estimate the related indirect costs, such as the
possible loss of productivity that may result when new con-
trols are implemented.
4. Even if precise information were available, it would soon be
outofdatedue to fast pacedchanges in technologyand factors
suchas improvements in tools available towould-be intruders.
The consequence of these difficulties is that it is neces-
sary for highly experienced cyber-security experts to carry out
assessments of system designs including their hardware/
devices, architecture, security software and practices before they
are implemented. The goal of such assessments is to ensure
that there is a proportionate level of security offered by the
proposed system in line with the consequences of a success-
ful attack. Clearly, investing too little in security measures leaves
a system exposed to an unacceptable level of risk; however,
investing too much is also a problem as it involves expend-
ing an unnecessary amount of money and effort on security
when the consequences of a successful attack are considered.
Unfortunately, it is often the case that there is insufficient
expertise to carry out all of the security assessments neces-
sary.The ever increasing number of information systems,which
themselves are of increasing complexity and exposed to con-
stantly evolving threats,mean that a greater number of security
assessments are required more quickly than ever before. In this
research we focus onmodelling parts of the assessment process
in order to create decision aids that can be used by experts to
reduce load, and by non-experts to achieve an approxima-
tion of security levels for security components and specific
technical attacks.
2.2. Machine learning approaches to security assessment
Over the years there have been many machine learning ap-
proaches to computer security, ranging from classic algorithm
based studies (Lane, 1998) to immune system inspired ap-
proaches (Kim et al., 2007). What almost all of these past
approaches have in common is that they attack the problem
from a quantitative point of view, based on evaluating datasets
such as network traffic, but without an attempt to integrate
often highly valuable knowledge held by security experts. Ex-
amples include what is probably the earliest use of fuzzy sets
in this context (Clements, 1977), intrusion detection based on
multisensor data fusion Bass (2000) or fuzzy cognitive maps
Siraj et al. (2001), and various automated decision systems to
support risk or threat analysis (Dondo, 2007; Linkov et al., 2006;
McGill and Ayyub, 2007; Ngai and Wat, 2005; Shah, 2003; Sun
et al., 2006; Van de Walle and Rutkowski, 2006). Other ap-
proaches include anomaly detection algorithms, e.g. using
Bayesian approaches (Androutsopoulos et al., 2000) to detect
spam in emails, or self-organisingmap algorithms to learn com-
binations of external signals and system call IDs to detect
unusual patterns (Feyereisl and Aickelin, 2012). Similar to
anomaly detection is the area of intrusion detection, which
again typically relies on unsupervised machine learning tech-
niques for two class classification approaches of “normal” and
“abnormal” behaviour, for example the work by Twycross and
Aickelin (2010).
More general approaches to systematising and supporting
methods for the design of secure systems have been re-
viewed by Baskerville (1993), Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) and
more recently by Jansen and Gallagher (2009). As a refine-
ment of more general approaches, this paper focuses on
extracting and making use of and leveraging the insight held
by cyber security experts. Experts are commonly good at as-
sessing the security of parts of systems – such as rating the
vulnerability of individual hops or attack paths. However, the
major challenges for experts are:
• The large number of hops and attack vectors in systems,
i.e. the finite number of suitably qualified experts makes
the timely assessment of hops and attack paths highly chal-
lenging for many users (e.g. companies).
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• The aggregation of often different ratings for the same com-
ponents by different experts, e.g. based on different expert
backgrounds or levels of expertise.
In this context, our paper focuses on alleviating the task
load for available experts by introducing, demonstrating and
evaluating a novel approach to partially automating the rating
of attack vectors based solely on individual hop ratings. The
approach proposed employs linear order statistics, specifi-
cally the ordered weighted average (OWA), to fuse individual
hop ratings into an overall attack path assessment, while the
weights of the OWA are determined using an evolutionary al-
gorithm, resulting in overall high quality attack vector
vulnerability assessments which closely follow those of experts
(if these experts directly assess the vectors). The closest body
of works in computer security that is related to our ap-
proaches is that of attack graphs and scenario creation, e.g.
the work by Tedesco and Aickelin (2008). However, in these ap-
proaches the aim tends to be to develop improved techniques
to construct and rate attack graphs, rather than facilitating and
partially automating the overall process of integrating expert
knowledge in cyber security assessments.
2.3. Weighted and Ordered Weighted Averages
In the experiments shown in this paper, two aggregation
methods are employed: weighted averages (WAs), and ordered
weighted averages (OWAs) (Yager, 1988). OWA operators were
chosen for the task of aggregating security component ratings
to produce attack rankings following discussions with a group
of GCHQ technical experts. In our discussions the hypothesis
emerged that the difficulty of a particular attack is largely de-
termined by the most difficult security component to attack
or evade; the remaining components contribute to the diffi-
culty in proportion with their own difficulty. Initially, we tried
simple maximum operators to see whether they could be used.
In practice however, this results in a lot of attacks having tied
ranks, providing little insight. This is because, if a particu-
larly difficult component appears in multiple attacks, they will
all receive the same rating. OWA operators allow us to assign
more weight to the most difficult components, while account-
ing for the difficulty of the remaining components too. This
greatly reduces the potential for tied ranks, and creates mean-
ingful rankings that distinguish between attacks.
Let X be a set of N information sources (e.g., reviewers,
experts, etc.) with each information source contributing evi-
dence xi, i = 1…N.The standard weighted average,WA, combines
the information from all the sources by associating the evi-
dence from each source with a given weight. More formally,
consider a set W of weights wi corresponding to each source
xi, where ∑ =wi 1. Then:
WA X wxi i
i
N
( ) =
=
∑
1
(1)
The ordered weighted Average, OWA, combines the infor-
mation from all the sources, ordered by the size of the evidence
(largest to smallest), using a pre-defined vector of weights,W′.
More formally, consider the vector of evidence O o oN= ( )1, ,… ,
formed by the ordering (largest to smallest) of the elements
in X, such that o o oj1 2≥ ≥… . Then:
OWA X w oj j
j
N
( ) = ′
=
∑
1
(2)
Whereas in the WA, the weights are associated with each
source, in the OWA, the weights are associated with an ordered
set of the evidence by all sources. Thus, in the OWA, a change
in contributed evidence can result in a different ordering and
thus in a different mapping of weights to evidence. For example,
in this work we assign a weight to the most difficult compo-
nent, the second most difficult component and so on. Each of
the weights is multiplied by the corresponding component, the
first weight is multiplied by the first and thus largest compo-
nent and so on. If the first weight is near to one, the OWA
behaves similarly to a “maximum” operator, thus resulting in
the overall assessment being based nearly exclusively on the
most difficult component.
OWAs are commonly used in decision making problems to
create aggregate scores and/or ratings. In Canós and Liern (2008),
OWA operators are used in a personnel selection problem to
aggregate selection criteria. In Badea et al. (2011) an OWA is
used to compute a rating of the security of energy supply, Sadiq
et al. (2010) describes the use of an OWA to aggregate perfor-
mance indicators of small water utilities creating an overall
performance assessment. Imamverdiev and Derakshande (2011)
show how a fuzzy OWA operator can be used for rating infor-
mation security products in terms of reduction of information
security risk, and in Merigó and Gil-Lafuente (2010) and Merigó
and Gil-Lafuente (2011) modified OWA operators are applied
to a financial product selection problem and a football team
player selection problem respectively.
2.4. Evolutionary Algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are a set of well used heuristic
search methods that mimic aspects of biological evolution to
evolve solutions. The most popular EA, the genetic algorithm
(GA) (see Holland, 1975 and Goldberg, 1989), begins with the
generation of a random initial population of solutions to which
fitness-based selection and copy, crossover and mutation opera-
tors are applied in order to discover near-optimal solutions.
The advantage of the GA is that it is able to search a large area
of the solution space, while evaluating a small proportion of
the possible solutions. This is critical for problems like those
seen in this work in which there are far more possible solu-
tions than it is practical to evaluate. The use of a GA to search
for suitable OWA weights is demonstrated in Nettleton and
Torra (2001) and Torra (2011), and in our own previous work
(Miller et al., 2013a).
The work in the current paper significantly extends the work
seen in Miller et al. (2013a) in which EAs were employed to
search for appropriate OWA weights to be used for aggregat-
ing ratings of security components to produce rankings of
technical attacks, and to search for WA weights to be used to
aggregate ratings of aspects of security components to produce
overall security component ratings. Using an EA in this way
not only allows us to discover suitable aggregation operators,
it also gives an indication of the relative importance of each
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component of the aggregation. For example, by looking at the
resulting OWA weights, we will be able to confirm or contra-
dict our hypothesis that the most difficult to attack/evade
security component contributes the most to the attack ranking.
As the EA could theoretically arrive at any OWA, and is led
purely by the fitness of an OWA (i.e., how well the resulting
rankings match individuals’ actual rankings), the OWAs pro-
duced are valid guides to the relative contributionmade by each
security component. Similarly, the WA weights found will
provide insight into which characteristics contribute most to
the overall rating, and which have little effect on the overall
difficulty of attacking/evading a security component.
2.5. Statistical analysis
To make comparisons between the results produced by the
OWA/WA operators and the experts’ actual rankings, Spear-
man’s Rho is used. Spearman’s Rho (Spearman, 1904), also
called Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, measures the
statistical dependence of two sets of rankings (ordinal data).
The coefficient is a number in [−1, 1] that indicates the level
of correlation; 1 denotes a perfect positive correlation, 0 means
there is no correlation, and −1 denotes a perfect negative cor-
relation. To measure the correlation between component
characteristics and overall difficulty questions Pearson’s r
(Pearson, 1895) is used. Pearson’s r, also called the Pearson
product–moment correlation coefficient (PPMCC), is a method
that measures linear correlation between two sets of values
(interval or ratio data); a value of zero indicates no correla-
tion and a value of one indicates perfect correlation. For both
methods, generally, values above 0.5 are interpreted as strong
correlation.
2.6. Experimental validation
The experimental results and statistical analyses presented in
this paper are not tested in a formal manner against, for
example, pre-specified null hypotheses or similar.Thus, in sta-
tistical terms, it should be viewed as exploratory data analysis
rather than as formal hypotheses testing (sometimes called con-
firmatory data analysis), as discussed by Tukey (1962). Overall
validation of the experimental methods in this paper is pre-
sented in terms of the degree to which it is possible to model
parts of cyber-security decision makers processes using sta-
tistical aggregation of components within attack vectors. As
this is exploratory, there are no explicit tests for falsifiability;
however, there is an informal null hypothesis that security
“experts” are not actually experts, and that no correlations, as-
sociations or aggregations could be found that would link rating
of sub-components to rankings of attack vectors. But, the main
purpose of this work is to carry out exploratory data analysis
in this context to explore to what degree it may be possible
to submit security assessment to more systematic methods,
which in future could lead to new hypotheses with associ-
ated methods of new data collection and analysis.
3. Data elicitation
In this section we will describe the data elicitation exercise con-
ducted at GCHQ, Cheltenham, UK. As the data and actual
elicitation are vital to the design and functionality of the au-
tomated reasoning system introduced later, we proceed by
describing the elicitation process and resulting data in detail.
Thirty nine highly experienced GCHQ selected cyber security
experts from government and commercial backgrounds in-
cluding system and software architects, technical security
consultants, penetration testers, vulnerability researchers and
specialist systems evaluators took part in a decision making
exercise. While the detail of the actual attack scenarios and
security components is not available for general publication,
we provide the actual numeric “anonymised” data in the paper.
3.1. Scenario
For the purposes of the exercise, a scenario was created and
presented by senior technical staff at GCHQ.The scenario was
designed to be a typical example of a government system.The
system has a range of core services and back end office facili-
ties, along with remote sites andmobile access. Fig. B.2 provides
an overview of the system architecture.The most sensitive in-
formation is held in core systems, with assets rated at Business
Impact Level 3 (BIL3). Business Impact Levels are the UK gov-
ernment’s standard classification scheme for rating the
ramifications of assets being disseminated, altered or de-
stroyed, ranging from no consequences (BIL0) to catastrophic
consequences (BIL6).
The experts were presented with information regarding the
architecture of the system and its components, and allowed
to ask questions. In real-world assessments, a great deal of in-
formation about a system and its components is required in
order to perform a security assessment, including details of
hardware and software, version/revision numbers and the fre-
quency with which updates and patches are applied. In order
to address this in the scenario, without overcomplicating the
exercise (making it infeasible), the experts were asked to make
assumptions about the system, specifically, that the software/
hardware used was typical of this type of government system
and that security policy was being applied in manner consis-
tent with how they typically find it in their day-to-day work.
This was acceptable for the experts, as they all have consid-
erable experience with the type of BIL3 government system
presented in the scenario, and how security policies are gen-
erally applied.
In addition to details of the system, the experts were also
given a list of 10 technical attacks on the system, and the 26
security components that make up the attacks. Fig. B.3 shows
an example of the information the expertswere given about the
technical attacks. In this attack an email with a malicious at-
tachment is sent to a recipientwithin the system,when opened
the attachment runs an exploit taking control of the recipient’s
PC, allowing the attacker to launch further attacks from their
machine.Fig.B.3a shows thepath the attacker takes fromoutside
the system,through thebackoffice systems.Once this is achieved
the attacker proceeds to the mobile sites as shown in Fig. B.3b,
completing the attack by compromising a client desktop.
The five steps in the attack are labelled A to E in Fig. B.3,
Table B.1 provides details of the security components in-
volved. Each of these components must be attacked
(compromised) or evaded (bypassed) in order for the attack
to be successful. After being shown the 10 attacks and their
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constituent components, the experts were asked to complete
two survey exercises:
1. Rank the 10 technical attacks in order of difficulty to com-
plete without being noticed.
2. Rate the 26 security components in terms of:
(a) The overall difficulty of attacking or evading the
component.
(b) Individual factors that contribute to the difficulty of at-
tacking or evading the component.
Each activity was conducted in silence, with experts sat at
separate desks, to avoid experts influencing each others’
opinions. Ranking the technical attacks like this is an
intuitive way of establishing the relative difficulty of complet-
ing each of the attacks successfully. Experts make direct
Fig. B.2 – Scenario system architecture. Note that symbols are self-explanatory following standard computer network
diagram drawing guidelines, based on Cisco icons (see
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/brand-center/network-topology-icons.html).
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comparisons between attacks. e.g., “Is attack x more or less
difficult than attack y?”, in order to arrive at a ranked list. This
approach can make it easier for experts to identify salient
attacks, as in some cases it is difficult to place a precise
value on the difficulty of an attack.
When rating security components, experts were asked to
give a rating on a scale from 0 to 100 to the question “Overall,
how difficult would it be for an attacker to successfully attack/
evade this component without being noticed?”, and a series
of questions about factors that contribute to the overall
Fig. B.3 – Example technical attack from scenario.
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difficulty of attacking/evading a component. These questions
were created by GCHQ technical experts, who identified what
they believed to be the important factors that contribute to the
difficulty of attacking/evading security components.The rating
scale from 0 to 100 was completely arbitrary, with no abso-
lute meaning of 0 or 100 being conveyed to the experts, and
the response included both a perceived location (“mean”) and
uncertainty (“variance”) of opinion as described in more detail
in Miller et al. (2013b).
Two sets of questions were used, one for when an attack
required a component to be attacked (compromised), and
another for when an attack required a component only to be
evaded (bypassed). The categorisation of components into
“attack” or “evade”was made by the GCHQ technical team who
designed the scenario. While it is possible that some compo-
nents may in practice be either attacked or evaded, and that
different attach vectors may be possible, such alternatives were
not considered. That is, the list of attack vectors created, and
whether the components were compromised or bypassed
within such an attack,were designed and specified by the GCHQ
technical team.
The questions asked when a component needed to be at-
tacked were:
• How complex is the target component (e.g., in terms of size
of code, number of sub-components)?
• Howmuch does the target component process/interact with
any data input?
• How often would you say this type of attack is reported in
the public domain?
• How likely is it that there will be a publicly available tool
that could help with this attack?
• How inherently difficult is this type of attack? (i.e., how tech-
nically demanding would it be to do from scratch, with no
toolset to help.)
• How mature is this type of technology?
• How easy is it to carry this attack out without being noticed?
• Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do this?
For components that needed only to be evaded, the follow-
ing questions were asked:
• How complex is the job of providing this kind of defence?
• How likely is it that there will be publicly available infor-
mation that could help with evading this defence?
• How mature is this type of technology?
• Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do
this?
This type of questioning allows experts to give an indica-
tion of the absolute difference in difficulty between security
components, unlike ranking which provides an intuitive way
to obtain an ordering but elicits no information about the degree
of difference between attacks.
The dataset created by this exercise is made up of three
levels:
1. Rankings of attacks.
2. Ratings of the overall difficulty of attacking/evading spe-
cific security components that make up attacks.
3. Ratings of characteristics/factors that contribute to the
overall difficulty of attacking/evading specific security
components.
Details of analysis work carried out previously on the re-
sulting data can be found in Miller et al. (2013b).
The exercise and methods described in this paper repre-
sent an important part of performing a security assessment
on a proposed system. The process of rating security compo-
nents and highlighting the easiest ways to attack a system via
its weakest components is critical to understanding the levels
of risk posed by a system design. In this study we will show
how rankings of attacks can be produced from overall ratings
of components, how overall ratings of components can be
created from ratings of characteristics of components, and how
the two stages can be chained together to produce attack
rankings from ratings of characteristics of components.
4. Data analysis methods
4.1. OWA/WA aggregation
The methodology in this paper is based on determining the
“optimum” weights for either WA or OWA aggregation of the
assessment of difficulty of compromising the various compo-
nents in a range of attack vectors. This in turn, enables both
the ranking of attack vectors in terms of their overall diffi-
culty as well as providing an understanding of exactly which
components in a security system contribute the most/least to
an overall system being compromised. Below, we briefly
summarise the methodology and detailed rationale for both
the WA and the OWA.
In all, 26 security components were rated, each belongs to
one or more of the 10 specified technical attacks. Table B.2 lists
the attacks, and their constituent security components. Notice
that some components appear more than once in the same
attack, this is because in some cases more than one instance
of a component needs to be attacked or evaded for an attack
to be completed successfully. For example, an attacker may have
to compromise multiple firewalls in order to obtain access to
their target. The order of components is important – alterna-
tive orderings, with perhaps alternative attack methodologies,
may be possible in the real world, but these would be consid-
ered as different overall attacks.
With the information regarding the composition of attacks,
aWA can be employed for the aggregation of the ratings of the
difficulty of attacking/evading a security component, to produce
an overall difficulty rating. In the instance of theWA, weights
Table B.1 – Components in example attack.
Step Attack/
evade
Component
A Evade Content checker
B Evade Anti-virus software
C Attack PDF renderer
D Evade Anti-virus software
E Attack Client access controls
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are applied to specific factors, e.g., the complexity of a com-
ponent. The result is a set of derived overall difficulty ratings
for all 26 security components. The core challenge here is the
search for the “optimal” weights of the given WA. To address
this, this paper proposes the use of evolutionary algorithms
(EAs) which will be discussed in the next section.
Similarly, an OWA is used to produce attack rankings from
overall difficulty assessments of their constituent hops.
However, as noted in Section 2.3, the OWA matches a vector
of weights to the ordered set of evidence (difficulties) for the
individual components. For instance, an OWA can be used to
aggregate overall difficulty ratings of components to produce
a rating for each of the ten attacks. As an example, Table B.3
shows the overall difficulty ratings that an expert gave for
attacking/evading the security components in Attack 1.
If we want to aggregate these values into an overall rating
for Attack 1 that gives more weight to the most difficult com-
ponents, we could choose the weights
′ = ( )W 0 33 0 27 0 20 0 13 0 07. , . , . , . , . .
The next step is to order the ratings
X = { }25 00 40 00 20 50 40 00 70 00. , . , . , . , .
by difficulty to create the ordering
O = ( )70 00 40 00 40 00 25 00 20 50. , . , . , . , . .
Equation 2 shows how the OWA can then be applied by mul-
tiplying each weight by its corresponding element in the
ordering. In this case the resulting value is 46.59. When we
compare this with the mean value 39.10, it can be seen that
this OWA operator has given more weight to those compo-
nents with higher difficulty ratings. If we then repeated this
process with the remaining nine attacks, a complete set of
attack ratings would be produced that could be used to gen-
erate attack rankings.
4.2. EA implementation
In this work, EAs (as introduced in Section 2.4) are used to
optimise the weights for:
1. WAs, used to aggregate ratings of difficulty of factors to
produce the overall difficulty ratings of security components;
2. OWAs, used to aggregate the overall difficulty ratings of se-
curity components to create rankings of the overall attack
vectors.
The EA has been implemented for both the WA and OWA
cases as follows.
Solutions are represented as a vector of weights. In this
example, the maximum number of security components in an
attack is eight; therefore, each vector contains eight weights.
Those attacks that do not have eight components are padded
out with zeros.This is to avoid concentrating weightings (which
must add up to 1) on fewer components, which can have the
effect of making an attack more difficult purely because the
weights are concentrated on fewer component ratings. In
general, an attack should get more difficult as components are
added to it.
An initial population of individuals is created at the begin-
ning of the algorithm. Each individual is produced by generating
seven random points on a line from 0 to 1. From this, eight
weights are created by taking the distances between 0, each
of the seven points, and 1.This ensures that the result is eight
values that add up to 1.
To compute fitness each expert’s actual attack ranking is
compared with the attack ranking derived from the overall se-
curity component rating with the current OWA.The comparison
is made using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which
produces a value between −1 (perfect negative correlation), 0
(no correlation) and 1 (perfect positive correlation). An error
value is then calculated by subtracting the correlation coeffi-
cient from 1, so a perfect positive correlation produces an error
of 0, and anything less produces an error value greater than
0. Once an error value has been calculated for each expert, the
mean squared error (MSE) is computed to give an error value
for each solution in the population.
Selection is achieved by sorting the population of solutions
by fitness, and then generating the indexes of selected parents
from a complementary cumulative distribution. A lower num-
bered individual is more likely to be chosen, ensuring that fitter
individuals a more likely to be selected, though potentially any
individual can be selected.
To guarantee that the fittest individual in successive gen-
erations is not worse that in preceding generations elitism selects
the best individuals from the current generation and copies
them unaltered into the next generation. A similar operator
is the copy operator, which takes a parent picked using the de-
scribed selection method and copies them into the next
generation.
Table B.2 – Attacks and their constituent security
components.
Attack Components
1 2,3,1,4,5
2 6,7,6,8,4
3 9
4 10,11,4,5
5 12,13,2,3,14,15,4,5
6 16,16,17,4,5
7 6,18,4,5
8 19,20,21
9 22,23,24
10 25,26,1,4,5
Table B.3 – Overall difficulty ratings for the security
components in attack 1.
Component Overall
difficulty
1 25.00
2 40.00
3 20.50
4 40.00
5 70.00
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The mutation operator used in this EA implementation ran-
domly selects two weights from a solution, increases one by
a small amount and reduces the other by the same amount.
This ensures that the weights still add up to one afterwards.
The resulting weights are validated, if either becomes greater
than 1 or less than 0, another two elements are selected.
The crossover method used is a single point crossover. Two
parents are selected and a child is created that consists of the
first four weights of the first parent, and the last four from the
second parent. It is unlikely at this point that the weights will
add up to 1, so they are normalised. This method of cross-
over ensures valid OWAs, while preserving the characteristics
of each contributing parent.
Finally, the EA’s termination criteria are set to be a specific
number of generations, after which the algorithm stops.
5. From factor ratings to security component
ratings
In Section 4, we described how an EA has been implemented
for use in this research. In this section we employ the de-
scribed EA to perform a search for WA weights. In these
experiments, we show how overall difficulty ratings for secu-
rity components can be obtained from ratings of their
characteristics using WAs where the weights have been dis-
covered using an EA. As well as producing overall difficulty
ratings, this process will also highlight which questions con-
tribute most/least to the overall ratings. In this case it is not
rankings that are being compared, it is ratings. Because of this,
Spearman’s rho is not an appropriate method for compari-
son so an alternative method of calculating fitness was
established.The “error” is directly calculated by taking the sum
of absolute differences between the derived hop ratings and
the experts’ actual hop ratings. Each expert’s error value is then
used to calculate a MSE value for all experts, which is used as
the fitness value for each solution.
When performing data analysis with the ratings of
characteristics/factors we found that the relationship between
them and the overall difficulty of attacking/evading a secu-
rity component varies between question sets. This is because
they contain different numbers of questions, and some ques-
tions are specific to a question set. Because of this, we will
perform separate experiments with the questions for attack-
ing and evading security components, findingWAs specific to
each.
5.1. EA configuration
Initially, a series of tests were conducted to find ideal configu-
rations of the EA. Full details of these experiments and their
results can be found in Appendix B. The best results for each
question set can be found in Table B.4; the best EA configu-
rations are shown in Table B.5. The best EA found for each
question set is used in the next subsection for extended
experiments.
5.2. Extended experiments
In these extended experiments the best EA configuration found
for each question set will be used in 30 runs with differing
random seeds. The purpose of these experiments is to assess
the consistency of the EAs, and to see the best results we can
reasonable expect with the EA. In experiments with the attack
question set the best configuration (Test 15) will be used;
Appendix B shows that multiple configurations achieved the
best result for the evade question set, of these we have arbi-
trarily chosen to use the configuration from Test 1. Table B.6
shows a summary of the results for the attack question set.
The results are extremely stable, there is little variation in the
results over the 30 runs. Table B.7 gives details of the bestWA
found.
The results of the experiments with the attack question set
show that there are clear differences in the relative impor-
tance of each question in deriving the overall difficulty of a
security component. In order, the questions are ranked as
shown in Table B.8. For comparison, the mean (over all 39
experts) Pearson’s r for the correlation between the ratings given
for each characteristic, and the overall difficulty is also given.
The weightings shown are taken from the test that resulted
Table B.4 – EA-WA: EA configuration – best results.
Test Mean Sp. MSE
Attack
15 0.7931 194.0125
Evade
1 0.2270 420.2156
Table B.5 – EA-WA: EA configuration – best EAs.
Attack
Test Gens Pop Copy Cross Mut
15 400 155 0.20 0.20 0.59
Evade
Test Gens Pop Copy Cross Mut
1 250 250 0.00 0.20 0.79
Table B.6 – EA-WA: extended experiments – attack.
Spearman’s Rho
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
0.7940 0.7919 0.7935 0.0005
MSE
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
194.2998 193.9896 194.0856 0.0741
Table B.7 – EA-WA: extended experiments – best WA –
attack.
Best weights
Test Complexity Interaction Frequency
22 8.43E-05 0.0012 0.1622
Tool Inherent Maturity Unnoticed
0.2189 0.4020 0.0438 0.1719
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in the lowest MSE (Test 22), though all tests produced similar
results.
The inherent difficulty rating has the highest weighting, and
it is also strongly correlated with the experts’ overall ratings
for security components. This may be because the experts do
not make a strong distinction between the inherent difficulty
of attacking a security component and the overall difficulty,
as the terms are similar. The weights attributed to the ratings
regarding factors of component difficulty are in line with the
correlation between experts’ ratings of each factor and their
overall rating for each component. In view of the weightings
and correlations, it is reasonable to say that the questions
ranked 1 to 4 have a demonstrable relationship with how
experts rate the overall difficulty of compromising a security
component. There does not appear to be a significant rela-
tionship between how experts rated the factors in questions
5 to 7 and how they rated the overall difficulty of compromis-
ing security components.
From this we could infer that these three questions about
the security components are not useful when trying to deter-
mine the difficulty of compromising a component, and that
only the four with high correlation/weighting are necessary.
Alternatively, it could be that the four high correlation/
weighting questions were the only ones that experts are able
interpret and answer in a consistent manner with the infor-
mation given. Regardless, using the four questions overall
ratings that are closely correlated with participants’ actual
ratings of overall difficulty can be produced.
Table B.9 provides a summary of the results with the evade
question set. Like the experiments with the attack question
set, the results are extremely stable. Over 30 runs, 28 pro-
duced the same MSE. Table B.10 shows the WA found in Test
1, though all weightings are within 0.0003 of those shown.
Again, some questions are consistently given more weight
than others. Table B.11 provides a list of the difficulty factor
questions ranked by the weight they were given by the EA.The
Mean correlation column in Table B.11 gives the mean Pear-
son’s r value for the correlation between experts’ ratings of
factors and their overall ratings.When compared with the cor-
relation values for the attack questions, these are much lower,
which may explain why the EA is unable to find aWA that pro-
duces overall ratings that are strongly correlated with experts’
actual overall ratings.
6. From security component ratings to attack
rankings
In this section, we describe how the EA was employed to
perform a search for OWA weights. The OWAs are to be used
for aggregating overall difficulty ratings of security compo-
nents to produce difficulty rankings of attacks. In these
experiments three groupings of experts have been used: odd
experts i.e., experts assigned an odd number, even experts i.e.,
experts assigned an even number and all experts.This has been
done so that OWAs discovered with one group (e.g., odd) can
be applied to the alternate group (e.g., even) to assess their ro-
bustness, and the all group can be used to obtain the best OWAs
that can be found for the entire group of experts for compari-
son purposes. Extended experiments are used with the best
configuration found with the all group to test the stability of
the configuration, and to further explore the best OWAs that
can be found.
Table B.8 – EA-WA: extended experiments – question
ranking – attack.
Rank Question Weight Mean
correlation
1 How inherently difficult is this
type of attack?
0.4020 0.6454
2 How likely is it that there will be a
publicly available tool that could
help with this attack?
0.2189 0.6732
3 How easy is it to carry this attack
out without being noticed?
0.1719 0.4543
4 How often would you say this type
of attack is reported in the public
domain?
0.1622 −0.6268
5 How mature is this type of
technology?
0.0438 0.1701
6 How much does the target
component process/interact with
any data input?
0.0012 −0.2741
7 How complex is the target
component?
8.43E-05 −0.0623
Table B.9 – EA-WA: extended experiments – evade.
Spearman’s Rho
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
0.2273 0.2270 0.2270 5.38E-05
MSE
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
420.2158 420.2156 420.2156 4.76E-05
Table B.10 – EA-WA: extended experiments – best WA –
evade.
Test Best weights
Complexity Information Maturity
1 0.2185 0.4971 0.2845
Table B.11 – EA-WA: extended experiments – question
ranking – evade.
Rank Question Weight Mean
correlation
1 How likely is it that there will be
publicly available information
that could help with evading
defence?
0.4971 −0.3307
2 How mature is this type of
technology?
0.2845 −0.0348
3 How complex is the job of
providing this kind of defence?
0.2185 0.0278
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6.1. EA configuration
Initially, a series of experiments was conducted to find ideal
configurations of the EA for use in these tests. Full details of
these experiments and their results can be found in Appendix
A.1.The best OWAs found are shown in Table B.12 and the best
results from these experiments are shown in Table B.13. The
best OWAs found for the odd and even groups will be as-
sessed for their robustness, and the best EA configuration for
the all group will be used in extended experiments.
6.2. OWA robustness
In order to assess the robustness of the OWAs found by the
EA, the best OWAs found for the odd group were applied to the
even group and vice versa. The results of these experiments
are provided in Table B.14. It can be seen that while there is
some degradation of performance when the OWAs are applied
to the alternate group, they produce rankings that are strongly
correlated with experts’ actual rankings (i.e., Spearman’s Rho
>0.5 indicating strong correlation) suggesting that they are
robust. As these OWAs work well on their alternate (unseen)
group, it is reasonable to expect that OWAs trained with sample
data will work well on unseen data.
6.3. Extended experiments
The final set of experiments take the best configuration found
with the all grouping and conduct 30 runs with varying random
seeds to allow assessment of the stability of the EAs, and to
give a better picture of the best OWAs that can reasonably be
expected using the proposed approach. The EA configuration
used is shown in Table B.15. A summary of the results of the
extended experiments can be found in Table B.16.The summary
shows that with 30 different random seeds, the results are very
stable, there is minimal difference between the solutions found
and they all result in OWAs that produce rankings that are
strongly correlated with experts’ actual rankings. Also of in-
terest is that in all 30 runs the solutions found never place less
than 0.92 of the weight on the most difficult to attack/evade
security component, corroborating our hypothesis that this is
the most important component when assessing the diffi-
culty of an attack.
7. From factor ratings to attack rankings
In this section we will use the bestWAs and OWAs, identified
as described in the previous sections, to derive attack rankings
Table B.12 – EA-OWA: EA configuration – best OWAs.
Test Best weights
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Even
12 0.8907 0.0011 0.0323 0.0120 0.0070 0.0174 0.0035 0.0359
13 0.8899 0.0044 0.0297 0.0126 0.0078 0.0242 0.0030 0.0284
Odd
13 0.7858 0.0223 0.1285 0.0471 0.0115 0.0031 0.0015 0.0002
16 0.7854 0.0246 0.1248 0.0479 0.0117 0.0033 0.0001 0.0021
All
1 0.9582 0.0028 0.0242 0.0003 0.0057 0.0029 0.0002 0.0056
2 0.9621 0.0017 0.0221 0.0003 0.0045 0.0059 0.0009 0.0025
Table B.13 – EA-OWA: EA configuration – best results.
Test Mean sp. MSE
Even
12 0.6885 0.1421
13 0.6866 0.1421
Odd
13 0.5732 0.2519
16 0.5733 0.2519
All
1 0.6159 0.2069
2 0.6159 0.2069
Table B.14 – EA-OWA: OWA robustness experiments.
Test Mean sp. MSE
Best even OWA applied to odd
12 0.5228 0.3013
13 0.5146 0.3118
Best odd OWA applied to even
13 0.5915 0.2381
16 0.5947 0.2337
Table B.15 – EA-OWA: extended experiments – EA
configuration.
Gens Pop Copy Cross Mut
250 250 0.00 0.20 0.79
Table B.16 – EA-OWA: extended experiments.
Spearman’s Rho
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
0.6200 0.6104 0.6150 0.0022
MSE
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
0.2137 0.2057 0.2092 0.0020
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from the difficulty factor ratings. This is a two stage process:
firstly, the best WAs will be used to compute overall difficulty
ratings for security components from ratings of factors of that
difficulty; secondly, the derived overall difficulty ratings will
be aggregated using the best OWA to create attack rankings.
Table B.17 shows the WA and OWA operators used, and
Table B.18 gives a summary of the results. Note that in this case
pairs of rankings are being compared, as such, error is calcu-
lated by subtracting the Spearman’s Rho value from 1, as in
Section 6. Because of this it can be seen that, for example, the
minimum error is the complement of the maximum Spear-
man’s Rho as they refer to the same individual. In the previous
experiments where overall difficulty ratings for security com-
ponents were being compared, error was calculated by taking
the absolute value of the differences between the actual ratings
provided by the experts, and the ratings derived from the dif-
ficulty factor ratings.
Themean Spearman’s Rho is 0.5562; this indicates that there
is a strong correlation between the rankings produced using
the difficulty factor ratings and those that the experts actu-
ally gave. It is clear that most experts answer the questions
relating to the factors of difficulty in such a way that it is pos-
sible to create overall ratings for security components and
rankings of attacks that closely match their opinions.
8. Discussion
The proposed method demonstrates that it is possible to model
parts of cyber-security decision makers processes using WAs
and OWAs.
For our first set of experiments we used an EA to search for
WA weights that can be used to take experts’ ratings of factors
that contribute to the difficulty of attacking/evading a secu-
rity component, and produce overall difficulty ratings for those
components. The results showed that for the attack question
set it is possible to produce overall ratings that closely match
experts’ actual rankings.With the evade question set however,
much poorer results were obtained. The EA highlighted the
factors that contribute the most to the overall rating, specifi-
cally questions regarding the availability of tools to help with
an attack, the difficulty of achieving the attack unnoticed, the
frequency of such attacks being reported and the inherent dif-
ficulty of completing an attack. The correlation of experts’
answers to these questions and their overall difficulty ratings
show that they have moderate/strong correlation, further sup-
porting their importance for this type of assessment. Conversely,
questions regarding the maturity of technology, the amount
of interaction with data and the complexity of components at-
tracted the least weight and were weakly correlated with the
overall ratings.This suggests that these factors were not helpful
in this particular exercise, though they may prove to be useful
under different circumstances.
The second set of experiments focused on using an EA to
find OWA weights that allowed us to aggregate overall ratings
of the difficulty of attacking/evading security components to
produce rankings of attacks for each expert that are strongly
correlated with the actual attack rankings that they pro-
vided. This shows that we can extrapolate from ratings of
individual components to rankings of complete attacks, light-
ening the load on experts.
It was also shown that if the participants are split arbi-
trarily, OWAs that work well with one group tend to well with
the other too. This is a useful result, as it alludes to the pos-
sibility of using OWAs to aggregate unseen experts’ hop ratings
to produce ratings and rankings of unseen attacks for a pro-
posed system. Comprehensive experiments showed that from
30 different starting positions (i.e., seeds) the EA consistently
found similar solutions, suggesting that they represent glob-
ally good solutions, and that in all 30 runs the EA never placed
less than 92% of the weight on the most difficult component.
From this, we can infer that when assessing the difficulty of
an attack, the most difficult to attack/evade security compo-
nent is by far the most important. Simply taking the maximum
proves impractical however, as it results in many attacks being
given the same rating and ranking.
The final set of experiments combined the processes in-
volved in the first and second sets of experiments. The best
WAs and OWA found in previous experiments were used to-
gether to produce rankings of attacks from experts’ ratings of
factors that contribute to the difficulty of a component. The
rankings produced, on average, show strong correlation with
experts’ actual rankings. This indicates that by asking tar-
geted questions about characteristics of security components,
specific technical attacks on proposed systems can be rated
and ranked in terms of difficulty and salience. From a machine
learning point of view, the proposed methodology where the
parameters (i.e. weights) of aggregation operators (bothWA and
OWA) are optimised using an EA is clearly not the only viable
approach. Different optimisation strategies such as simu-
lated annealing could be explored, while the actual aggregation
operators could be generalised for example to fuzzy integrals
(Grabisch et al., 2000) where more complex weights captured
by fuzzy measures enable a more fine-grained weighting.
Table B.17 – Factor ratings to attack rankings: WAs and
OWA.
Index WA
Attack Evade OWA
1 8.43E-05 0.2185 0.9484
2 0.0012 0.4971 6.7E-05
3 0.1622 0.2845 0.0368
4 0.2189 - 0.0120
5 0.4020 - 0.0008
6 0.0438 - 0.0016
7 0.1719 - 0.0002
8 - - 0.0002
Table B.18 – Factor ratings to attack rankings: results.
Spearman’s Rho
Max Min Mean Standard deviation
0.9636 −0.4303 0.5562 0.3387
Error
Max Min MSE Standard deviation
1.4303 0.0364 0.3117 0.3387
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These results raise the possibility of using ratings of secu-
rity components to produce ratings and rankings for unseen
attacks on proposed information systems.This could take the
form of a database of ratings of generic security components
(we have seen that lack of technical detail does not prevent
reasoned assessment) which could be used for “What if?” sce-
narios to give an approximate assessment of the difficulty of
attacks when security components are altered or moved. The
degree to which this exciting possibility is feasible in prac-
tice is a matter of future research.
The major contribution of this paper to cyber-security re-
search lies in its use of exploratory data analysis to demonstrate
the feasibility of linking the experts rating of components of
attacks to the overall ranking of the difficulty of the attack
vectors themselves. In doing so, it both confirms the techni-
cal methodology of using WAs and OWAs to perform the
aggregation, as well as confirming that the experts’ ratings and
rankings do have internal consistency with each other – which
is not a a priori given, and in some ways can therefore be taken
as refutation of our informally posed null hypothesis (that the
security experts are not really experts). Hence, not only do these
methods provide practical possibilities for systematising the
analysis of attack vectors, but they also offer the future pos-
sibility of being used as some form of professional competence
test (or accreditation) of security expertise. The results of this
work also have the potential to reduce both the cost and time
required to perform similar estimates through automation.
However, we emphasise that these practical benefits will require
further research and development.We are not aware of similar
approaches to this problem being reported in literature,making
direct comparisons impossible. We hope that this paper will
initiate many similar studies in the future.
9. Conclusions
In this work we have presented a method of finding good ag-
gregation operators for creating rankings of technical attacks
on a proposed system and ratings of security components,
which has the added advantage of also highlighting salient
factors and security components. To do this, we have used a
data set collected during a decision making exercise at GCHQ
in which cyber-security experts performed security assess-
ment tasks on a realistic system proposal. The results showed
that using the proposed method, it is possible to produce
rankings of technical attacks on a system using ratings of se-
curity components, ratings of security components from ratings
a specific factors of difficulty, and finally, rankings of techni-
cal attacks on a system from ratings of specific factors. These
outcomes present the possibility of using ratings of generic se-
curity components (or their characteristics) in “What if?”
scenarios to assess the impact of altering/moving compo-
nents within a system design.
The work has produced important insights that enable the
construction of expert security assessment support tools. Such
tools have the potential to reduce the time and effort re-
quired of experts for assessments, and enable systems designers
to produce approximate security assessments before they seek
expert advice. These advances will address growing concerns
about the capacity of limited expert resources in view of the
increasing complexity and growing number of information
systems that are under attack from an ever changing set of
attacks.
As noted in Section 8, this paper does not advocate the pro-
posed approach of optimising the parameters of the given
aggregation operators as a unique solution. Indeed, it is likely
that other approaches will achieve similar, and in the case of
more complex approaches such as fuzzy integrals, more
nuanced results. However, the proposed architecture pro-
vides a viable approach which enables the generation of highly
useful results and insight in the challenging area of expert-
led cyber security system assessment. The same general
methodology may be applied to a variety of similar situa-
tions in which the modelling of expert opinion, particularly
when aggregating sub-criteria, is desired.
Future work in this area will involve efforts to create the
generic security component databasementioned previously and
applying the techniques shown here to assess the practical-
ity of providing decision support for systems architects in the
process of designing new systems. In addition, we are explor-
ing the applicability of the proposed approach to related areas
such as “adversary characterisation” in cyber-threat intelligence.
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Appendix A. EA configuration experiments
This appendix contains details of the experiments con-
ducted to find ideal EA configurations for the OWA/WA search.
Appendix A.1. EA for use with OWAs
This subsection contains the experiments conducted to find
an EA configuration to be used in the experiments performed
in Section 6.
Initial experiments focused on discovery of an ideal con-
figuration for the EA, which is a significant problem in itself.
In order to create a practical test schedule that could be com-
pleted in a reasonable time frame, these experiments were split
into two parts: 1) evolutionary operator proportions and 2) gen-
erations and population sizes.
Appendix A.1.1. Part 1 – evolutionary operator proportions
Table B.19 shows the configurations tested in the first part. For
all of these experiments 1% elitism was applied to a popula-
tion of 250 over 250 generations.The population and generations
values have been chosen arbitrarily in order to explore the op-
erator proportions. Appropriate values for population and
generations will be examined in later experiments.
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The best results for these experiments are given in
Table B.20. The results for all three groupings show that con-
figurations that have a large proportion of mutation and a
smaller proportion of crossover work best, and that the pro-
portion of copy has little effect on the results. As the best
individuals are automatically copied from one generation to
the next via elitism, this may reduce the impact made by the
copy operator. Table B.21 gives details of the OWAs found in
each of the best experiments listed in Table B.20. It can be seen
that in all cases, the EA is finding OWAs that place signifi-
cantlymore weight on themost difficult to attack/evade security
component than the remaining components.
Appendix A.1.2. Part 2 – population and generations
In the second part of the EA configuration experiments, the
focus switched to the number of generations and population
size.The best evolutionary operator proportions from the first
part of testing were used in a series of experiments with varying
population sizes/numbers of generations. Table B.22 provides
the population sizes and numbers of generations tested. The
best results from these experiments are shown in Table B.23.
It should be noted that in the first part two configurations were
joint best for the all group, both were tested in this part. The
best result for the all group shown in Table B.23 was achieved
with operator proportions from Test 2. In this set of experi-
ments there is much less variation in the results than was seen
in the first part of testing; altering the operator proportions had
a greater effect on results than altering the population sizes
and number of generations. Table B.24 gives details of the OWAs
found in each of the best experiments listed in Table B.23.Again,
the EA is finding OWAs that place significantly more weight
on the most difficult to attack/evade security component than
the remaining components.
Appendix B. EA for use with WAs
This subsection contains the experiments conducted to find
an EA configuration to be used in the experiments performed
in Section 5.
Table B.19 – EA-OWA: evolutionary operator proportion
experiments.
Test Copy Cross Mut
1 0.00 0.20 0.79
2 0.20 0.20 0.59
3 0.40 0.20 0.39
4 0.60 0.20 0.19
5 0.79 0.20 0.00
6 0.50 0.00 0.49
7 0.30 0.40 0.29
8 0.20 0.60 0.19
9 0.10 0.80 0.09
10 0.00 0.99 0.00
Table B.20 – EA-OWA: evolutionary operator proportions
– best results.
Test Mean Sp. MSE
Even
3 0.6866 0.1425
Odd
1 0.5713 0.2543
All
1 0.6159 0.2069
2 0.6159 0.2069
Table B.21 – EA-OWA: evolutionary operator proportions
– best OWAs.
Test Best weights
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Even
3 0.8985 0.0059 0.0311 0.0102 0.0065 0.0258 0.0037 0.0184
Odd
1 0.7872 0.0185 0.1242 0.0505 0.0111 0.0032 0.0029 0.0024
All
1 0.9582 0.0028 0.0242 0.0003 0.0057 0.0029 0.0002 0.0056
2 0.9621 0.0017 0.0221 0.0003 0.0045 0.0059 0.0009 0.0025
Table B.22 – EA-OWA: population and generations
experiments.
Test Gens Pop
11 50 1250
12 100 625
13 200 315
14 300 210
15 400 155
16 500 125
Table B.23 – EA-OWA: population and generations – best
results.
Test Mean sp. MSE
Even
12 0.6885 0.1421
13 0.6866 0.1421
Odd
13 0.5732 0.2519
16 0.5733 0.2519
All
15 0.6165 0.2080
Table B.24 – EA-OWA: population and generations – best
OWAs.
Test Best weights
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Even
12 0.8907 0.0011 0.0323 0.0120 0.0070 0.0174 0.0035 0.0359
13 0.8899 0.0044 0.0297 0.0126 0.0078 0.0242 0.0030 0.0284
Odd
13 0.7858 0.0223 0.1285 0.0471 0.0115 0.0031 0.0015 0.0002
16 0.7854 0.0246 0.1248 0.0479 0.0117 0.0033 0.0001 0.0021
All
15 0.9456 0.0022 0.0296 0.0006 0.0068 0.0011 0.0086 0.0055
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Appendix B.1. Part 1 – evolutionary operator proportions
In the first set of experiments a series of evolutionary opera-
tor proportions are tested. As in the previous experiments, a
fixed population of 250 is run over 250 generations and 1%
elitism is applied. Table B.25 shows details of the configura-
tions tested, the best results for each question set are shown
in Table B.26.
These initial results show that the results are significantly
different for each question set. The attack questions produce
ratings that are extremely strongly correlated with experts’
actual overall difficulty ratings, while the WAs for the evade
questions produce ratings that are weakly correlated with
experts’ actual ratings.
Appendix B.2. Part 2 – population and generations
In the second part of the EA configuration experiments the best
evolutionary operator proportions found for each question set
in part 1 are used in a series of experiments with varying popu-
lation sizes and numbers of generations. Table B.27 provides
the configurations tested and Table B.28 shows the best results.
Again, the results for the attack question set are far supe-
rior to those for the evade questions.
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